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1. The new euro environment
Introduction of the euro certainly represents a sea-change in the environment of
modern global finance. In the three decades since the end of the Bret on Woods system
in 1971, and against great odds, Europe has forged a platform that could ultimately
emerge as a viable challenger to the United States as the world’s premier financial
market. It was a difficult birth – but if ever the saying “no pain, no gain” applies in
context of macro-financial reform, this is it.2
Financial institutions are extraordinarily sensitive even to small changes in the
environment. Increases in interest-rate or exchange-rate volatility can create wholly new
markets for risk-management products, just as surely as these businesses – often built-
up at huge expense – can be wiped-out overnight if volatility drops. Regulatory
concerns  about counterparty or liquidity risk in over-the-counter markets can quickly
drive transactions onto organized exchanges and their standardized contracts, and
eliminate much of the innovation that is most easily undertaken in interprofessional OTC
markets. Similar stories could be related to changes in tax codes, transaction-costs,
information technologies, and an array of other variables that form the environmental
overlay of business strategy in the financial services industry. These are parameters
that management has to carefully think through, build a consensus on, and then place
its strategic bets. When mistakes are made in devising core strategies in the financial
services  industry, they are usually big ones.
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2The advent of the euro is probably the most important current development in the
environment of the world’s financial institutions, and therefore has to be carefully related
to the strategies of financial firms. Other contemporary issues, such as emerging market
financial crises, regulation of hedge funds, and Japan’s continued economic doldrums
pale by comparison. The euro will redefine a large part of the global financial landscape
of the 21st century. Strategies of European financial services firms in their home markets
have already been profoundly affected by competitive conditions that have yet to be
fully delineated. Meanwhile outsiders, notably American firms long used to competing in
a massive single-currency market, have big strategic plans for the euro-zone. In some
cases they have already made incursions into European financial services markets that
would have been undreamed-of a few years ago. As financial reconfiguration in the
euro-zone proceeds alongside continued technological advance in both the wholesale
and retail domains, as regulatory and tax policy alignment continues to change the rules
of the game, and as clients become increasingly performance-oriented and
promiscuous, core strategies of financial firms – many of whom continue to think in
terms of institutional boundaries instead of financial processes – will come under
additional stress.
This paper begins with a series of suppositions – essentially maximum-likelihood
state-variables relating to financial system conditions in the euro-zone, assuming a five-
year time horizon. These suppositions set the framework for a discussion of strategic
positioning and implementation on the part of financial services firms expecting to
compete successfully in the euro-zone. We focus on the institutional microstructure of
the financial intermediation process and the determinants of competitive performance.
This is followed by an assessment of strategic opt ons facing financial firms in the euro-
zone, and alternative institutional outcomes from the perspective of efficiency and
stability of the uro-zone financial system. Where appropriate, comparisons are drawn
with the U.S. financial system, which has operated under a single currency since 1865.
The final section of the paper provides some strategy and policy indications for the
future.
1.1. Suppositions
Any competent strategic exercise aiming at creating and sustaining a high-
performance financial services franchise in the euro-zone has to start by taking a view
on the basic drivers of financial markets – as well as various regulatory overlays – and
their impact on the prospective size and structure of the market for wholesale and retail
financial services. If some of management’s suppositions turn out to be wrong,
expensive and possibly debilitating strategic mistakes may be the result.  Box 1
presents the likely impact on financial markets of the introduction of the eur .
If these environmental suppositions are broadly borne-out by the facts, the euro-
zone market for financial services is likely to be a very dynamic one indeed, both in
terms of its overall prospects within the broader context of the global financial system
and in terms of its structure. This runs across the entire spectrum of wholesale and
retail financial activities. There is plenty of growth potential in wholesale capital market
activities as the new government bond market envelops the constituent national
markets and as the corporate and asset-backed bond markets accelerate the
Box 1- Suppositions
The Government Bond Market
· Eleven euro-zone government bond markets, estimated at $1.9 trillion in 1998, are roughly
comparable in size to the United States.  There will be growing standardization of government
bonds in the euro-zone, including auction calendars and interest calculations, as well as new
instruments such as inflation-indexed bonds denominated in euros.
· The changed fiscal environment will constrain the issuance of national government bonds and
the rate of growth of the market, and push financing onto municipalities and other public
finance entities, sometimes with state guarantees.
· Trading in euro-zone government bonds, driven historically by interest rate and exchange rate
factors among the participating countries are likely to be driven mainly by credit spreads in
the future. The 23 bp and 20 bp spread between Germany and Portugal and Belgium,
respectively, at the end of 1998 are far smaller than those between the states in the U.S.
Without future sovereign bailouts, these may be too narrow. Euro-zone government bonds
will be subject to conventional rating criteria and corporate spreads will no longer be capped
by home-country government spreads.
The Corporate Bond Market
· The euro-zone corporate bond market was estimated at $160 billion in 1998, one-sixth the
size of the United States, with limited liquidity. Outstandings may rise to $800 billion over ten
years as capital market financing replaces bank financing, as a high-capacity, liquid euro-zone
market replaces fragmented national markets, and as national investment restrictions are
scrapped.
· Incremental demand for assets denominated in euros can be expected to lower average
interest rates and the cost of capital facing euro-zone corporations even in the presence  of
growing demand for financing in euros. Increased trading volume and market liquidity will
reduce transactions costs for investors and issuers.
· The market for non-investment grade debt in Europe has already grown rapidly as investors
search for yield and as the financing requirements of small, high-growth companies increase,
a development that is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
· The market for asset-backed securities in the euro-zone, very small in comparison to that in
the United States, will grow rapidly as various tax and regulatory impediments are removed,
and as banks rethink how much capital they should have tied-up in their lending book.
Already some of the pioneering securitization of commercial loans has taken place in Europe,
with significant mutual gains for borrowers, investors and intermediaries.
The Market for Equities
· Euro-zone equity market capitalization was estimated to be $2.5 trillion in mid-1998,
compared to about $10 trillion in the United States, with various forecasts pointing to a
tripling over a decade or so.  The euro-zone’s 32 stock exchanges in 1998 (compared to 8 in
the U.S.) and 23 derivatives exchanges (compared to 7 in the U.S.) will consolidate rapidly
even as trading, clearance and settlement systems become more efficient.
· Secondary markets for equities in the euro-zone will increasingly be characterized by block-
· Secondary markets for equities in the euro-zone will increasingly be characterized by block-
trading, as large institutional investors grow in importance, and with it the need for risk
management, capital and institutional distribution capability.  There will be growing use of
innovative equity-linked financial instruments and structured transactions for which the
national European markets were previously too small, too fragmented and illiquid, too tightly
regulated or too uncompetitive to make them attractive.
· The creation of euro-equity benchmarks like the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 and the FTSE
Eurotop 100 will strengthen performance orientation of asset managers as well as
corporations, promoting the shift from national to sectoral asset allocation.
· Accelerated development of IPOs and the small-cap equity market can be foreseen, promoted
by the success of markets such as Nouveau Marché in France and Neuer Markt in Germany,
as well as growth in the volume of MBOs, LBOs, venture capital  and private equity.
Retail Financial Services
· Retail financial services markets in the euro-zone will change only gradually, due to wide
differences in preferences and the historical dominance of certain types of institutions such as
savings banks, mortgage banks, cooperative banks and postal savings banks, as well as
equally significant differences in the insurance industry.
· New products and retail distribution channels will gradually encroach on legacy structures, as
they have already done in the case of bancassurance, which will gradually make the retail
financial services market more open to competition, both cross-border and between domestic
strategic groups.
· As demographics confront heavy reliance in most euro-zone countries on unfunded (pay-as-
you-go) or underfunded pension schemes, governments are being forced to introduce pre-
funded pension systems. New schemes will focus on defined contribution formulas that shift
management responsibility to beneficiaries, suggesting a growing role for mass-distribution
and branding of pension products.  This will eventually form massive, performance-driven
managed pools of fixed-income securities and equities. As involuntary “noise” traders, these
will make a disproportionate contribution to euro-zone financial market liquidity and
efficiency (see Walter, 1999).
· The euro-zone mutual fund industry will be contested by banks, insurance companies,
independent fund management companies, as well as financial conglomerates.  However,
retail financial services in the euro-zone will be subject to strong consumer protection
measures at the national level, which may retard penetration of non-traditional and innovative
products and distribution channels.
3replacement of bank debt, as it has done in the United States. Equity markets should
develop rapidly as well, propelled by rising volumes of new issues and an expanding
need for equities in pre-funded pension plans as some of the euro-zone countries come
to grips with the demographic reality of aging populations. Economic sectors, individual
corporate prospects,  and credit quality will replace currencies in asset allocation
strategies. And at the retail level, clients will face an increasing array of financial
services from a wide variety of vendors using traditional and nontraditional approaches
to distribution, with local and regional financial services oligopolies confronting
unprecedented challenge.
The potential for change brought about by the euro is set against a state of
substantial overcapacity and inefficiency in broad segments of the euro-zone’s financial
services industry. There is too much capital and there are too many people employed in
the production and distribution of financial services – as there have been in the United
States. Both will be removed in a process of restructuring and consolidation that has
only just begun. It will take a long time, most particularly in the retail sector in view of the
importance of government-related and cooperative institutions in Europe that are not
subject to the shareholder-value discipline. The ruthlessness of the U.S. restructuring
process will be missing, and this is likely to retard the movement to a new equilibrium in
terms of financial structure. And of course nobody wants to be shaken-out, so tenacious
rear-guard actions will be mounted by vulnerable players even as new entrants –
including the ubiquitous Americans hardened by their own structural revolution – crowd
into the European marketplace.
Table 1 shows some of the differences between European and U.S. financial-
sector restructuring via mergers and acquisitions (M&A), with U.S. intra-sector M&A
volume during the period 1985-97 almost three times the European volume in banking,
three times as large in securities and twice as large in insurance. This despite the fact
that the EU plus Switzerland comprises a larger economic region than the United
States. Inter-sector M&A volume was higher in Europe for banks buying insurance
companies, presumably due to the popularity of bancassurance and the absence of
legal barriers. Table 2 shows the cross-border aspects of financial services M&A
activity. Most important among U.S. acquisitions abroad are investment firms buying
other investment firms (notably British merchant banks and asset managers) and
insurance companies buying foreign insurance companies. Intra-European cross-border
transactions are mainly intra-sectoral, with almost half occurring in the insurance
industry. When European firms acquire non-European ones (mainly in the United States
and Japan), this is again largely on an intra-sector basis.
Developing and implementing strategies in firms hoping to secure a permanent
and profitable place in the coming euro-zone financial services configuration thus
presents challenges that will test the mettle of even the most far-sighted and determined
managers. It centers around seven basic questions:
• Strategic positioning. Given the foregoing environmental suppositions governing
the euro-zone, what are the target markets – in terms of clients, products and
geographic spread – that promise the most attractive opportunities for growth
over time?
Table 1
Volume of In-Market Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States and Europe, 1985-98
(billions of U.S. dollars and percent)
Acquiring Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance
Institution
Commercial 435 18 0.2 186 16 21
Banks (53.4%) (2.2%) (0.0%) (36.9%) (3.2%) (4.2%)
Securities 6 98 29 27 31 31
Firms (0.7%) (12.0%) (3.6%) (5.4%) (6.2%) (6.1%)
Insurance 73 15 140 45 9 137
Companies (9.0%) (1.9%) (17.2%) (9.0%) (1.8%) (27.2%)




Volume of Cross-Market Mergers & Acquisitions in the United States and Europe, 1985-98
(billions of U.S. dollars and percent)
Acquiring Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance
Institution
Commercial 15.1 6.3 0.2 21.5 5.9 0.4 40.2 11.0 0.9
Banks (16.0%) (6.6%) (0.3%) (15.4%) (4.2%) (0.3%) (16.9%) (4.6%) (0.4%)
Securities 3.6 19.8 5.7 4.9 8.9 2.5 7.9 26.7 8.1
Firms (3.8%) (20.9%) (6.1%) (3.5%) (6.4%) (1.8%) (3.3%) (11.2%) (3.4%)
Insurance 0.6 4.4 38.7 21.1 1.8 72.6 22.1 5.8 115.1
Companies (0.7%) (4.6%) (41.0%) (15.1%) (1.3%) (52.0%) (9.3%) (2.5%) (48.4%)
Source: DeLong, Smith and Walter [1999] and Securities Data Company. The first figure is the dollar value (in billions) of M&A activity
and the second number in parentheses is the percentage of the total (these sum to 100 for each 3x3 matrix). Figures reported 
are the sum of the equity values of the target insitutions.
U.S.-non U.S. Intra-Europe Europe-Non Europe
Target Institution
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over time in terms of competitive structure? There is not much sense in going
through the effort and expense of gearing up – for what looks like a potentially
profitable market if, at the end of the day, competitors are doing the same thing
and market structure ends up approximating perfect competition, incapable of
supporting attractive, sustained returns on the capital employed. Herd-like
behavior is well known among financial services managers and strategists,
especially in the face of major parameter-shocks like creation of the euro-zone,
and it may be advisable to stay out of the way of the stampede.
• Core competencies. What is the firm really good at, in terms of its baseline
market position and franchise, creativity and innovation, flexibility, ability to
manage complexity, command of financial and human resources? What
competitive resources can be rolled-out geographically or focused on defensible
market segments in response to euro-zone developments?
• Operating economies. To what extent are there economies of scale, cost
economies of scope and production-efficiencies that can be exploited in order to
reinforce the firm’s competitive position?
• Revenue synergies and earnings diversification. Are there revenue economies of
scope that can be exploited by linking products and clients, and are these cross-
selling gains likely to prevail across the euro-zone for target retail and/or
wholesale client segments? Relatedly, are there significant earnings-stability
gains to be had by diversifying across clients, financial services activities and
geographies within the euro-zone?
• Institutional configuration. What types of institutional configurations do the
strategic positioning considerations suggest are the ones most likely to maximize
the value of the enterprise, running across the institutional spectrum from
massive euro-zone universals or multifunctional financial services conglomerates
to specialists that are highly focused on best-in-class delivery of specific types of
financial services?
• Ability to execute. Based on the firm’s existing situation and an objective
assessment of competitive strengths and weaknesses – a “reality check” – is it
reasonable to envision its transformation into what will be required in the light of
the environmental suppositions, given resource and managerial constraints, with
reasonable but not excessive urgency?
Financial intermediation in the countries comprising the euro-zone has
traditionally been heavily dominated by commercial banks, insurance companies and
savings institutions, together capturing about 85% of all financial assets in the system in
1998, compared with about 40% in the United States. If the same economics of
disintermediation apply in both regions, one would expect the role of classic euro-zone
intermediaries to decline dramatically over time. In order to “go with the flow” banks will
have to develop viable strategies to compete in mutual fund management, pension fund
5management, capital market access, asset ecuritization, custody and securities
transaction-processing, etc. So will insurance companies and savings institutions. And
there will be plenty of room for specialists of various kinds. The financial services
industry, in short, is beginning a profound shakeup which will ultimately settle into some
sort of new institutional equilibrium, and nobody is quite sure yet how that will look. But
if the United States is any sort of reasonable guide, it will be a highly varied and
dynamic field of players.
2. Searching for Operating Economies and Revenue Synergies
As in many other industries, a major purported benefit associated with the advent of the
euro is the realization for the first time of significant economies of scale and economies
of scope. For the first time as well, an unprecedented degree of competitive pressure
will bear on long-sheltered European financial firms, and force them to manage better.
Regardless of scale or scope benefits, this will create a leaner, more cost-effective set
of competitors to the benefit of their own shareholders and the European financial
system.
Individually or in combination, economies (diseconomies) of scale and  scope in
euro-zone financial firms will lead to increased (decreased) profit margins or passed
along to clients in the form of lower (higher) prices resulting in a gain (loss) of market
share. They should be directly observable in cost functions of financial services
suppliers and in aggregate performance measures. Unfortunately, studies of scale and
scope economies in financial services are unusually problematic.1 The nature of  the
empirical tests used, the form of the cost functions, the existence of unique optimum
output levels, and the optimizing behavior of financial firms all present difficulties.
Limited availability and conformity of data present serious empirical problems. And the
conclusions of any study that has detected (or failed to detect) economies of scale
and/or scope in a sample selection of financial institutions does not necessarily have
general applicability. Such difficulties notwithstanding, the potential impact of the euro
on operating economics (production functions) of financial firms is so important – and so
often used to justify mergers, acquisitions and other strategic initiatives – that available
empirical evidence is central to the whole argument.
2.1. Economies of Scale
Whether economies of scale exist in financial services has been at the heart of
strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum firm size in the financial services
sector. Can increased average size of firms create a more efficient financial sector and
can it increase shareholder value?
For example, large organizations may be more capable of themassive and
“lumpy” capital outlays required to install and maintain the most efficient information-
technology and transactions-processing infrastructures. If extremely high technology
spend-levels result in higher efficiency, then large financial services firms will tend to
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6benefit in competition with smaller ones. However, smaller organizations ought to be
able to pool their resources or outsource scale-sensitive activities in order to capture
such gains
In an information- and distribution-intensive industry with high fixed costs such as
financial services, there should be ample potential for scale economies – as well as
potential for diseconomies of scale attributable to disproportionate increases in
administrative overhead, management of complexity, agency problems and other cost
factors once very large firm-size is reached.  If economies of scale prevail, increased
size will help create systemic financial efficiency and shareholder value. If diseconomies
prevail, both will be destroyed.
Examples of inancial-sector megamergers in 1998 alone include Deutsche Bank
and Bankers Trust as the first intercontinental mega-deal, creating the world’s largest
bank with combined assets of $849 billion in November 1998, Swiss Bank Corporation
and Union Bank of Switzerland in Europe to form UBS AG ($749 billion), and Citibank
and Travelers to form Citigroup ($702 billion), Banco Santander and Banco Central
Hispanoamericano  to form BSCH ($300 billion) in January 1999, as well as such major
1998 U.S. deals as First Chicago NBD and BancOne, and BankAmerica and
NationsBank.  Bankers regularly argue that “bigger is better” from both systemic and
shareholder-value perspectives, and usually point to economies of scale as a major
reason why. What is the evidence?
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking,
insurance and securities industries over the years (see Saunders, 1996 for a survey).
Estimated cost functions form the basis most of these empirical tests, virtually all of
which have found that economies of scale are achieved with increases in size among
small banks (below $100 million in asset size). More-recent studies have shown the that
scale economies may also exist in banks falling into the $100 million to $5 billion range.
There is very little evidence so far of scale economies in the case of banks larger than
$5 billion. An examination of the world’s 200 largest banks [Saunders and Walter, 1994]
found evidence that very largest banks grew more slowly than the smaller among the
large banks during the 1980s, but that limited economies of scale did appear among the
banks included in the study. More recently, there is some scattered evidence of scale-
related cost gains of up to 20% for banks up to $25 billion in size. [Berger and Mester,
1997] But according to a new survey of all empirical studies of economies of scale
through 1998, there was no evidence of such economies among very large banks.
[Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1998] The consensus seems to be that scale
economies and diseconomies generally do not result in more than about 5% difference
in unit costs.
Inability to find major economies of scale among large financial services firms is
also true of insurance companies [Cummins and Zi, 1998] and broker-dealers
[Goldberg, Hanweck, Keenan and Young, 1991]. And among German universal banks
Lang and Wetzel [1998] found diseconomies of scale in both banking and securities
services.  Annex 1 shows the 20 largest European and U.S. banks, all of which are well
are much larger than the size of banks for which any empirical evidence of scale
economies has been found. The data also show the top-20 European banks to be much
7larger than the top-20 U.S. banks.
So, for most banks and nonbank financial firms in the euro-zone, except the very
smallest among them, scale economies seem likely to have relatively little bearing on
competitive performance. This is particularly true since many of the smaller European
institutions are linked-together in cooperatives or other structures that allow harvesting
available economies of scale centrally, or are specialists not particularly sensitive to the
kinds of cost differences usually associated with economies of scale in the financial
services industry. Big deals like those cited above and most of the megamergers that
may appear in the euro-zone in coming years are unlikely, whatever their other merits
may be, to contribute very much in terms of scale economies unless the fabled
“economies of superscale” turn out to exist -- these, like the abominable snowman, have
unfortunately never been observed in nature.
A basic fallacy, of course, is focusing on firm-wide scale economies when the
really important scale issues are encountered at the level of individual financial services.
There is ample evidence, for example, that economies of scale are both significant and
important for operating economies and competitive performance in areas such as global
custody, processing of mass-market credit card transactions and institutional asset
management, but are far less important in other areas – private banking and M&A
advisory services, for example. Unfortunately, empirical data on cost functions that
would permit identification of economies of scale at the product level are generally
proprietary and therefore unavailable. Still, it seems reasonable that a scale-driven pan-
European strategy may make a great deal of sense in specific areas of financial activity
even in the absence of evidence that there is very much to be gained at the firm-wide
level.
2.2. Economies of Scope
There should also be potential for economies of scope in the euro-zone financial
services sector – competitive benefits to be gained by selling a broader rather than
narrower range of products –  which may arise either through supply- or demand-side
linkages.
On the supply side, scope economies involve cost-savings achieved through
sharing of overheads and improving technology via joint production of generically similar
services. Cost-diseconomies of scope may arise from such factors as inertia and lack of
responsiveness and creativity that may come with increased firm size and
bureaucratization, "turf" and profit-attribution conflicts that increase costs or erode
product quality in meeting client needs, or serious cultural differences across the
organization that inhibit seamless delivery of a broad range of financial services.
Most empirical studies have failed to find cost-economies of scope in the
banking, insurance or securities industries, and most of them have concluded that some
diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the financial services sector add
new product-ranges to their portfolios. Saunders and Walter [1994], for example, found
negative supply-side economies of scope among the world’s 200 largest banks – as the
product range widens, unit-costs seem to go up.
8Scope economies in most other studies of the financial services industry are
either trivial or negative (see Saunders, 1996). However, the period covered by many of
these studies involved institutions that were  shifting away from a pure focus on banking
or  insurance, and may thus have incurred considerable costs in expanding the range of
their activities. If this diversification effort involved significant front-end costs – which
were expensed on the accounting statements during the period under study – that were
undertaken to achieve future expansion of market-share or increases in fee-based
areas of activity, then we might expect to see any strong statistical evidence of
diseconomies of scope (for example, between lending and non-lending activities of
banks) reversed in future periods. Investment in staffing, training, and infrastructure in
fact bear returns in the future commensurate with these expenditures, then neutral or
positive cost economies of scope may well exist. Still, the available evidence remains
inconclusive.
On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when
the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier –
including the  cost of the service, plus information, search, monitoring, contracting and
other transaction costs – is less than the cost of purchasing them from separate
suppliers. Revenue-diseconomies of scope could arise, for example,  through agency
costs that may develop when the multi-product financial firm acts against the interests of
the client in the sale of one service in order to facilitate the sale of another, or as a result
of internal information-transfers considered inimical to the client's interests.
Managements of universal banks and financial conglomerates often argue that broader
product and client coverage, and the increased throughput volume and/or margins this
makes possible, leads to shareholder-value enhancement.
Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, it is nonetheless
reasonable to suggest that revenue economies of scope may indeed exist, but that
these are likely to be very specific to the types of services provided and the types of
clients served. Strong cross-selling potential may exist for retail and private clients
between banking, insurance and asset management products (one-stop shopping), for
example. Yet such potential may be totally absent between trade-finance and mergers
and acquisitions advisory services for major corporate clients. So demand-related scope
economies in the uro-zone are clearly linked to a firm’s specific strategic positioning
across clients, products and geographic areas of operation [Walter, 1988]. Indeed, a
principal objective of strategic positioning in the “new” model of European financial
services  is to link market-segments together in a coherent pattern – what might be
termed “strategic integrity“– that permits maximum exploitation of cross-selling
opportunities, and the design of incentives and organizational structures to ensure that
such exploitation actually occurs. These are, however, extraordinarily difficult to achieve
and must work against multiple-vendor behavior on the part of corporate and
institutional clients as well as a new generation retail clients comfortable with non-
traditional approaches to distribution such as the Internet.2
                                                         
2Recent consumer surveys in the United States show that client reactions to multi-product vendor
relationships are viewed very positively in principle, but in fact American retail clients have significantly
increased the average number of financial services firms they deal with throughout the 1990s.
92.3. Production-efficiency
Besides economies of scale and cost-economies scope, financial firms of roughly
the same size and providing roughly the same range of services can have very different
cost levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence of such performance differences,
for example, in comparative cost-to-income ratios among banks or insurance
companies or investment firms both within and between national financial-services
markets. The reasons involve differences in production functions, efficiency and
effectiveness in the use of labor and capital, sourcing and application of available
technology, and  acquisition of inputs, organizational design, compensation and
incentive systems – i.e., in just plain better management.
Empirically, number of authors have found very large disparities in cost
structures among banks of similar size, suggesting that the way banks are run is more
important than their size or the selection of businesses that they pursue [Berger,
Hancock and Humphrey, 1993; Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993]. The consensus of
studies conducted in the United States seems to be that average unit costs in the
banking industry lie some 20% above “best practice” firms producing the same range
and volume of services, with most of the difference attributable to operating economies
rather than differences in the cost of funds [Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1996].
Siems [1996] finds that the greater the overlap in branch-office networks, the higher the
abnormal equity returns in U.S. bank mergers, while no such abnormal returns are
associated with increasing concentration levels in the regions where the bank mergers
occurred. This suggests that any shareholder value gains in many of the financial
services mergers of the 1990s were more highly associated with increases  in
production efficiency (often termed X-efficiency) than with reductions in competition.
If very large institutions are systematically better managed than smaller ones
(which may be difficult to document in the real world of financial services) then there
may be a link between firm size and X-efficiency. In any case, both from a systemic and
shareholder-value perspective, management is (or should be) under constant pressure
though their boards of directors to do better, to maximize X-efficiency in their
organizations and to transmit that pressure throughout the enterprise. If the euro-zon
intensifies that pressure, this may in the end be one of the most significant sources of
financial-sector performance gains.
 Taken together, the available empirical suggests very limited prospects for firm-
wide cost economies of scale and scope among major financial services firms, and that
X-efficiency  seems to be the principal determinant of observed differences in cost
levels among banks and nonbank financial institutions. Demand-side economies of
scope through cross-selling may well exist, but are likely apply very differently to
specific client segments and can be vulnerable to erosion due to greater client
promiscuity in response to sharper competition and new distribution technologies.
Based on these considerations alone, therefore, there appears to be room in the euro-
zone for viable financial services firms that range from large to small and from universal
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to specialist in a rich mosaic of institutions, as against a competitive monoculture
dominated by financial mastodons.
3. Prospective Market Structures in Euro-zone Financial Services
In addition to the strategic search for operating economies and revenue
synergies in the uro-zone financial services industry of the future, firms will also seek
to dominate markets in order to extract economic rents. Europe has a long history of
imperfect market structures and sometimes cartel formation in various industries, and
the financial services market  has been no different.
The role of concentration and market power in the financial services industry s
an issue that empirical studies have not yet examined in great depth, although in many
national markets for financial services, suppliers have shown a tendency towards
oligopoly. Supporters have argued that high levels of national market concentration are
necessary in order to provide a platform for a viable pan-European or global competitive
position. Opponents argue that monopolistic market structures without convincing
evidence of scale economies or other size-related gains serve mainly to extract
economic rents from consumers or users of financial services and redistribute them to
shareholders, cross-subsidize other areas of activity, or  reduce pressures for cost-
containment. They therefore advocate vigorous anti-trust action to prevent exploitation
of monopoly positions.3
The key strategic issue is the likely future competitive structure of financial
services in the uro-zone, since margins tend to be positively associated with higher
concentration levels, as do cost-to-income ratios. Financial services market structures
differ widely among countries, as measured for example by the Herfindahl-Hirshman
index,4 with very high levels of concentration in countries such as the Netherlands,
Finland and Denmark, and low levels in relatively fragmented financial systems such as
the United States and Germany. The market-concentration issue is perhaps best
considered separately for wholesale and retail financial services.
With respect to wholesale financial services, the competitive structure that
prevails in the uro-zone is likely to be similar to that prevailing in the global market.
National markets for wholesale financial services in the euro-zone countries are already
increasingly contested, with corporate and institutional clients under pressure to find the
best and most competitively-priced products regardless of vendor. American and other
European firms have achieved impressive incursions on traditional domestic client
                                                         
3In the case of Canada, two megamergers that would have reduced the number of major financial firms
from five to three was disallowed by the authorities in late 1998 despite arguments by management that
major American financial services firms would provide the necessary competitive pressure to prevent
exploitation of monopoly power.
4The Herfindahl-Hirshman index is the sum of the squared market shares (H=3s2), where 0<H<10,000
and market shares are measured for example, by deposits, by assets, or by capital. H rises as the
number of competitors declines and as market-share concentration rises among a given number of
competitors.
Table 3
Concentration Trends in the U.S. Financial Services Industry
Number of firms and percent)
Asset Asset Capital Asset Asset
share of share of share of Ten share of share of
Number of Number of Eight Firm Number of Eight Number of Eight Number of Largest Number of Eight Number of Eight
U.S. Bank Banking Concentration Firms Largest Firms Largest Firms Firms Firms Largest Firms Largest
Charters Organizations Ratio Firms Firms Firms Firms
1988 13,130 9,881 22.3% 1,367 41.7% 940 32.5% 6,432 57.5% 3,175 13.5% 13,875 6.3%
1989 12,727 9,620 22.6% 1,288 40.4% 1,193 32.4% 6,141 61.8% 3,100 15.0% 13,371 6.5%
1990 12,370 9,391 22.3% 1,223 39.0% 1,272 32.4% 5,827 63.6% 2,725 18.2% 12,860 6.7%
1991 11,949 9,168 25.7% 1,221 38.1% 1,267 32.2% 5,386 62.1% 2,386 19.9% 12,960 6.8%
1992 11,496 8,873 26.4% 1,177 37.2% 1,232 32.2% 5,260 62.2% 2,086 19.3% 12,594 7.4%
1993 11,001 8,446 28.1% 1,187 36.4% 1,197 31.5% 5,292 63.4% 1,726 17.7% 12,317 7.7%
1994 10,491 8,018 29.7% 1,082 35.3% 1,187 31.3% 5,426 60.9% 1,532 19.2% 11,991 7.9%
1995 9,984 7,686 30.4% 1,054 34.9% 1,179 33.7% 5,451 59.3% 1,420 21.7% 11,687 7.9%
1996 9,575 7,421 34.3% 1,001 34.7% 1,138 36.1% 5,553 58.5% 1,322 21.3% 11,392 7.8%
1997 9,216 7,234 35.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5,597 55.5% 1,201 30.6% 11,238 8.0%
Source:  Allen N. Berger, Rebecca S. Demsetz and Philip E. Strahan, T e Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, 
and Implications for the Future (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1998).




relationships. This is likely to be reinforced by the euro. The pan-European wholesale
banking market should be highly fluid, as has long been the case in the United States.
The top-10 firms in global fixed-income and equity underwriting, loan
syndications and M&A mandates in 1997 ranged  from U.S. broker-dealers like Merrill
Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter to multifunctional financial
conglomerates like UBS, Deutsche Bank and Citigroup – see Annex 2.  The dominance
of the U.S. firms is evident from this data.  Of the top-10 firms, eight were American, two
were European and none was Japanese. Of the top-20 firms, 13 were American, seven
were European and none was Japanese. The 1998 announced merger of Citicorp and
Travelers would have moved its combined market share to No. 2 in the 1997 rankings,
and the acquisition of Bankers Trust by Deutsche Bank would have moved the
combined firm to No. 10 in the rankings. This picture may shift in the years ahead, as
the major European universal banks acquire or build significant wholesale market-
shares against their American rivals – especially if introduction of the euro and higher
levels of capital-market integration creates disproportionate growth Europe’s share of
global transaction-flow.
A significant number of firms below the top-10 have the ambition to move up in
the rankings. Indeed, global wholesale banking shows very little evidence so far of
systematically increasing market concentration to levels capable of supporting
sustained excess returns.  The H rfindahl-Hirshman index for the top 10 firms rose
gradually since 1990, but was still only 572 in 1997. For the top 20 firms, the index rose
from 430 in 1995 to 621 in 1997. But the index is still very low compared with many
other industries, indicating a high level of market competition despite some evidence of
an rising trend in concentration. This indicates a very competitive global wholesale
market prevailing well into the future, one that is far tougher than the term “global bulge
bracket” – a small coterie of highly profitable global firms – suggests.5
With respect to wholesale financial services, competitive conditions that will exist
in the global market are likely to exist in the euro-zone as well, which suggests a highly
competitive market structure for the foreseeable future. This is good news for the euro-
zone financial system as a whole, but not such good news for shareholders expecting
sustained high profitability from wholesale banking activities. Nor is there much
evidence so far that size as conventionally measured (e.g., by assets or capital) makes
much difference in determining wholesale banking market share.
The situation is likely to be very different with respect to market structure in retail
financial services. Here the geography of local and regional market concentration is
clearly  more important, and what will no doubt be a very low uro-zone Herfindahl-
Hirshman index for retail banking, insurance and investment services as a whole can
mask high levels of regional or local concentration that are capable of supporting
monopolistic pricing. The key question here is whether the advent of euro will trigger the
kind of geographic cross-penetration observed in the United States after the relaxation
                                                         
5Such data, of course, mask much higher concentration levels in specific areas of wholesale banking
activity. But with the exception of initial public offerings (IPOs) the evidence of margin erosion is
compelling, suggesting highly contestable global sub-markets that are likely to prevail well into the future.
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of interstate banking restrictions in the 1990s.6 American retail financial services
markets have become increasingly contestable, with large national and superregional
banking networks like Bank of America, Key Corp., Fleet Financial and First Union
battling it out for regional market-share with smaller, local institutions surprisingly adept
at survival.  Table 3 shows that, among all types of financial services firms doing
business with the general public, only banks and savings institutions have shown
significant increases in concentration (8-firm ratio) during the period 1988-97 – from
22.3% to 35.5% – while concentration has decreased substantially in the life insurance
industry. Even in the case of banks, the Herfindahl-Hirshman index has decreased from
2,020 in 1988 to 1,949 in 1997 in urban areas, and from 4,316 to 4,114 in non-urban
areas – this during a period of dramatic industry consolidation in the United States.
Recent research [Kwast, Starr-McCluer and Wolken, 1997] shows that retail
banking clients remain strongly dependent on financial services firms with a local
presence, and where there is a high level of concentration this is reflected in both
interest rates and deposit rates. [Berger and Hannan, 1987] However, the most
profitable firms in the industry were not clearly identified with highly concentrated
markets, suggested that other competitive factors seem to be more important. On the
other hand, bank mergers that increased local concentration sufficiently to trigger
antitrust guidelines of the Department of Justice (a Herfindahl-Hirshman index
exceeding 1800 and a 200-point increase in the index as a result of the merger) was
associated with reduced deposit rates. [Prager and Hannan, 1999]   The U.S. has
implemented a legislative constraint against excessive market concentration in the form
of the Riegle-Neal Act, which limits the share of retail deposits captured by mergers to
30% in a given state and 10% nationally, although these limits do not apply in the case
of organic growth.7 And despite continued consolidation and capacity reduction in the
industry, in 1998 almost 300 new U.S. commercial bank charters were issued. There
remains stiff competition from mutual fund companies, broker-dealers and insurance
companies as well – i.e., intense competition both within and between strategic groups.
It seems likely that the kind of contestable retail financial services market that
exists in the United States will be slower in coming to the euro-zone. Pan-European
mass-market branding is not easy to achieve. Local and national consumer preferences
remain strong, with no particular reason to change unless there are demonstrable gains
in terms of pricing or service quality provided by foreign firms. Nationally entrenched
retail financial firms have generally improved their performance to the point that foreign
players have a difficult time doing much better, and penetrating local markets by
acquisition can be prohibitively expensive. So far, successful cross-border retail
businesses are largely in niches like private banking or consumer finance, with broader-
based incursions like Deutsche Bank in Italy or ING in Belgium confined to special
situations. Still, change will come, especially with a new generation of consumers less
                                                         
6Insurance and investor services were never subject to such restrictions, although there continues to be
prudential regulation at the state level.
7The merger of BankAmerica and NationsBank in 1998 created a national market share of 8% for the new
Bank of America, which is very close to the limit but can be circumvented by moving assets off the
balance sheet or non-deposit funding.
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tied to local vendors and new ways of delivering financial services. Markets that are
already highly concentrated and characterized by high margins will be increasingly
challenged. This suggests that the euro will eventually undermine existing monopolistic
market structures,  with little prospect of high levels of retail market concentration in the
euro-zone as a whole in the foreseeable future.
Finally, the asset management industry (where the top firms comprise a mixture
of European, American and Japanese firms and at the same time a mixture of banks,
broker-dealers, independent fund management companies and insurance companies –
see Annex 3) is perhaps the most contestable in the entire financial services industry.
Any number can play, as long as they have strong distribution, performance and client
service capabilities. With a Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 540 for the top-40 firms in the
industry and very little signs of increasing concentration in recent years, this sector of
the euro-zone’s financial system is likewise likely to remain highly competitive. Despite
this, the quality of earnings in asset management is relatively high, and provides an
anchor of stability for financial firms that are also engaged in much more volatile parts of
the business.
The role of the state at the national, regional and municipal level will also have a
major impact on competitive structure and performance in the uro-zone, and remains
rather unclear. The state is far more heavily involved than in the United States, ranging
from the European Investment Bank through the German Landesbanken to municipal
savings banks. Public guarantees and other forms of support, as well as performance
pressures, are very different from those facing investor-owned financial firms. When
public- and private-sector firms meet in the market, competitive outcomes will clearly be
affected. Consequently, the value extracted from a given market structure may be
substantially smaller than expected in the presence of explicit or implicit subsidies
imbedded in the activities of state-linked firms in the market. Similar points could be
made with respect to cooperatives and mutuals, which play a major role across much of
the euro-zone.
One can conclude that the euro is unlikely to have much of an impact on market
concentration in wholesale financial services, which is basically a globalized industry, or
in asset management. At the same time, it may gradually reduce regional and local
market concentration by introducing new competitors. If this is correct, a good
proportion of the gains associated with restructuring and competitive development in the
euro-zone financial services sector will flow to end-users rather than shareholders. This
will place an even greater premium on astute strategic positioning and execution on the
part of financial firms.
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4. Universal banking versus specialist institutions
4.1. Firm Structure and Financial Stability
Proponents of universal banking as the dominant current and future form of
strategic organization of financial services argue that the aforementioned operating
economies and synergies, as well as non-destructive competition, can best be assured
if the core of the evolving financial system in the euro-zone comprises bank-based
multifunctional financial organizations [van den Brink, 1998].
There is also the argument that greater diversification of income from multiple
products, client-groups and geographies creates more stable, safer, and ultimately more
valuable institutions.  Indeed, there is some evidence that this is the case.  Saunders
and Walter [1994] carried out a series of simulated mergers between U.S. banks,
securities firms and insurance companies in order to test the stability of earnings of the
“merged” as opposed to separate institutions. The  opportunity-set of potential mergers
between existing firms and the risk-characteristics of each possible combination were
examined. The findings suggest that there are indeed potential risk-reduction gains from
diversification in multi-activity  financial services organizations, and that these gains
increase with the number of activities undertaken. The main risk-reduction gains appear
to arise from combining commercial banking with insurance activities, rather than with
securities activities.  Such empirical studies may exaggerate the risk-reduction benefits
of universal banking because they ignore many of the operational costs involved in
setting up and managing these activities.8
It has also been argued that shares of European-type universal banks,
incorporate substantial franchise value due to their conglomerate nature and importance
in national economies, which Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan [1996] suggest serve
to inhibit extraordinary risk-taking.  They find substantial evidence that the higher a
bank’s franchise value, the more prudent management tends to be, so that large
universal banks with high franchise values should serve shareholder interests as well as
stability of the financial system – and  the concerns of its regulators – with a strong
focus on risk management, as opposed to banks with little to lose. This conclusion is, of
course, at variance with the observed, massive losses incurred by European universal
banks in recent years in lending to highly leveraged firms, real estate lending and
emerging market transactions.
It is certainly the case that a number of large financial institutions will play a
major role in the future financial configuration of the euro-zone.  Failure of one of these
institutions is likely to cause unacceptable systemic consequences, and the institution is
virtually certain to be bailed-out by taxpayers — as happened in the case of
comparatively much smaller institutions in the United States, Switzerland, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Japan during the 1980s and early 1990s.9  Consequently, too-big-
                                                         
8     That is, only the financial firms in existence for the full 1984-88 period are considered.
9The speed with which the central banks and regulatory authorities reacted to the 1996 Sumitomo copper
trading scandal signaled the possibility of safety-net support of the global copper market, in view of major
banks’ massive exposures in highly complex structured credits.
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to-fail (TBTF) guarantees create a potentially important public subsidy for universal
banking organizations.
Of course,  “free lunches” usually don’t last too long, and sooner or later such
guarantees invariably come with strings attached.  Possible regulatory responses
include tighter limits on credit- and market-risk exposures, stronger supervision and
surveillance intended to achieve “early closure” in advance of capital depletion, and
structural barriers to force activities into business units that can be effectively
supervised in accordance with their functions even at the cost of a lower levels of X-
efficiency and scope economies.
4.2. Conflicts of Interest
The potential for conflicts of interest is endemic to the kinds of multifunctional
financial services firms that characterize the uro-zone, and runs across the various
types of activities in which they are engaged.10
First, when firms have the power to sell affiliates’ products, managers may no
longer dispense "dispassionate" advice to clients and have a salesman's stake in
pushing “house” products, possibly to the disadvantage of the customer. Second, a
financial firm that is acting as an underwriter and is unable to place the securities in a
public offering may seek to ameliorate this loss by "stuffing" unwanted securities into
accounts over which it has discretionary authority. Third, a bank with a loan outstanding
to a client whose bankruptcy risk has increased, to the private knowledge of the banker,
may have an incentive to induce the corporation to issue bonds or equities to the
general public, with the proceeds used to pay-down the bank loan.11 Fourth, in order to
ensure that an underwriting goes well, a bank may make below-market loans to third-
party investors on condition that the proceeds are used to purchase securities
underwritten by its securities unit. Fifth, a bank may use its lending power activities to
coerce a client to also use its securities or securities services. Finally, by acting as a
lender, a bank may become privy to certain material inside information about a
customer or its rivals that can be used in setting prices, advising acquirors in a
contested acquisition or helping in the distribution of securities offerings underwritten by
its securities unit.
Mechanisms to control conflicts of interest can be market-based, regulation-
based, or some combination of the two.
In most of the uro-zone countries few impenetrable walls exist between banking
and securities departments within universal banks, and few external firewalls exist
between a universal bank and its non-bank subsidiaries (e.g., insurance).12 Internally,
                                                         
10For a detailed discussion, see Saunders and Walter [1994], Chapter 6.
11A recent example is the 1995 underwriting of a secondary equity issue of the Hafnia Insurance Group by
Den Danske Bank, distributed heavily to retail investors, with proceeds allegedly used to pay-down bank
loans even as Hafnia slid into bankruptcy. This case is now before the courts. See Smith and Walter
[1997B].
12    For a comprehensive catalog of potential conflicts of interest, see Gnehm and Thalmann [1989].
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there appears to be a reliance on the loyalty and professional conduct of employees,
both with respect to the institution's long-term survival and the best interests of its
customers. Externally, reliance appears to be placed on market reputation and
competition as disciplinary mechanisms. The concern of a bank for its reputation and
fear of competitors are viewed as enforcing a degree of control over the potential for
conflict exploitation.  The United States, on the other hand, has had a tendency since
the 1930s to rely on regulation, and in particular on "walls" between types of activities.
Either way, preventing conflicts of interest is an expensive business. Compliance
systems are costly to maintain, and various types of walls between business units can
have high opportunity costs because of inefficient use of information within the
organization.13
The conflict of interest issue may seriously limit effective strategic options.  For
example, inside information accessible to a bank as lender to a target firm would almost
certainly prevent it from acting as an adviser to a potential acquirer. Entrepreneurs are
unlikely to want their private banking affairs dominated by a bank that also controls their
business financing. A mutual fund investor is unlikely to have easy access to the full
menu of available equity funds though a universal bank offering competing in-house
products. These issues may be manageable if most of the competition is coming from
other universal banks. But if the playing field is also populated by aggressive insurance
companies, broker-dealers, fund managers and other specialists, these issues will
prove to be a continuing strategic challenge to management.
4.3. A Conglomerate Discount?
It is often argued that the shares of multi-product firms and business
conglomerates tend (all else equal) to trade at prices lower than shares of more
narrowly-focused firms. There are two reasons why this “conglomerate discount” is
alleged to exist.
First it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital
inefficiently. Empirical work by Berger and Ofek [1995] assesses the potential benefits
of diversification (greater operating efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net
present value projects, greater debt capacity, lower taxes) against the potential costs
(higher management discretion to engage in value-reducing projects, cross-
subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain resources from healthy
businesses, mis-alignments in incentives between central and divisional managers).
The authors demonstrate  an average value-loss in multi-product firms on the order of
13-15%, as compared to the stand-alone values of the constituent businesses for a
sample of U.S. corporations during the period 1986-91. This value-loss was smaller in
cases where the multi-product firms were active in closely-allied activities within the
same two-digit standard industrial code (SIC) classification.
The bulk of value-erosion in conglomerates is attributed by the authors to
overinvestment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. In empirical
work using event-study methodology, John and Ofek [1994] show that asset sales by
                                                         
13    A detailed discussion is contained in Smith and Walter [1997A], Chapter 8.
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corporations result in significantly improved shareholder returns on the remaining capital
employed, both as a result of greater focus in the enterprise and value-gains through
high prices paid by asset buyers.
Such empirical findings from event-studies of broad ranges of industry may well
apply to diversified activities carried out by financial firms as well. If retail banking and
wholesale banking are evolving into highly-specialized, performance-driven businesses,
one may ask whether the kinds of conglomerate discounts found in industrial firms may
not also apply to universal banking structures, especially as centralized decision-making
becomes increasingly irrelevant to the requirements of the specific businesses.
A second possible source of a conglomerate discount is that investors in shares
of conglomerates find it difficult to “take a view” and add pure sectoral exposures to their
portfolios. Investors may avoid such stocks in their efforts to construct efficient asset-
allocation profiles. This is especially true of highly performance-driven managers of
institutional equity portfolios who are under pressure to outperform cohorts or equity
indexes. So the portfolio logic of a conglomerate discount may indeed apply in the case
of  a multifunctional financial firm that is active in retail banking, wholesale commercial
banking, middle-market banking, private banking, corporate finance, trading, investment
banking, asset management and perhaps other businesses.  In effect, a financial
conglomerate shares are a closed-end mutual fund of a broad range of assets.
Both the portfolio-selection and  capital-misallocation effects (perhaps mitigated
by the franchise and TBTF effects mentioned earlier) may thus weaken investor
demand for financial conglomerate shares, and lower their equity prices.  In the context
the euro-zone universal banks and other financial conglomerates, management will
have to come up with a compelling set of counter-arguments, particularly when
investors have the choice of placing their bets on more narrowly-focused financial
specialists.
4.4. Linkages Between Financial and Nonfinancial Firms
In most of the uro-zone countries, including France and Germany, banks and
insurance companies have traditionally held large-scale shareholdings in nonfinancial
corporations or have been part of multi-industry holdings of financial groups. There are
various historical reasons for this, such as politically-driven interests of the state to
intervene directly in the control of industry and past economic crises that forced banks
to capitalize debt in the face of threatened client bankruptcies. There are also portfolio
reasons, such as the need of insurance companies to invest massive reserves in the
absence of sufficiently broad and deep local capital markets –  inevitably leading to
major equity positions in nonfinancial corporations as well as banks. And there are
relationship reasons, with banks viewing shareholdings in client firms as an important
part of  “Hausbank” ties that would attract most of the client’s financial services
business, even as clients themselves value the presence of a reliable lender who looks
beyond a purely arm’s length credit relationship.
The absence of efficient capital markets in many European countries has
historically produced a powerful role for the types of “internal” capital markets that can
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be seen in industrial conglomerates, long-term cross shareholdings, equity stakes
cementing strategic alliances and other institutional and financial ties between banks,
insurance companies and industrial companies. Of course, the causality can run the
other way too, with European-style “insider” relationships tending to perpetuate
themselves.  This will impede the development of alternatives such as commercial
paper markets, corporate bond markets, and strong equity markets capable of attracting
broad stock  holdings on the part of individuals, pension funds and mutual funds. This in
turn will limit shareholder-value pressures and periodic governance challenges to
corporate underperformance though hostile corporate action.
The value of bank shareholdings in industrial firms or insurance companies is, of
course, embedded in the market price of bank shares. The combined value of the bank
itself and its industrial shareholdings may be larger or smaller than the sum of their
stand-alone values. For example, Hausbank ties to corporations in which a bank has
significant financial stakes and a direct governance role may raising the value of the
bank. On the other hand, if such “tied” sourcing of financial services raises the cost of
capital facing client corporations, this will in turn reduce the value of bank's own
shareholdings. The reverse may be true if such ties lower client firms' cost of capital.
Permanent bank shareholdings may also stunt the development of a contestable market
for corporate control, thereby impeding corporate restructuring and depressing
competitive performance and stock prices,  which in turn are reflected in the value of the
bank to its shareholders. Banks may also be induced to lend to affiliated corporations
under credit conditions that would be rejected by unaffiliated lenders, and possibly
encounter other conflicts of interest that may ultimately make it more difficult to
maximize shareholder value.
In effect, a shareholder of euro-zone banks with significant industrial
participations obtains a closed-end mutual fund that has been assembled by bank
managers for various reasons over time, and may bear no relationship to the investor’s
own portfolio optimization goals. The value of the bank itself then depends on the total
market value of its shares, which must be held on an all-or-nothing basis, plus its own
market value.
Bank-industry linkages have for some time been subject to reexamination in
many of the euro-zone countries, especially in terms of their impact on economic
restructuring and overall economic performance in comparison with the more capital-
market oriented “Anglo-American” approach. Even without the U.K. as a founding
member of the uro-zone, companies like DaimlerChrysler, VEBA, Aegon and Alcatel
have exposed themselves to market-based shareholder-value discipline, even as
developments are underway that may ultimately lead to a pan-European equity market
capable to meeting the needs of massive performance-driven institutional pension funds
and mutual funds. And there is a clear tendency toward loosening bank-industry ties,
both on the part of corporations seeking better access to financing and advice and on
the part of bankers seeking to manage their equity portfolios more actively – most
notably in the establishment of DB Investor by Deutsche Bank late in 1998. So it seems
clear how the “battle of the systems” of corporate governance is running, with a pan-
European capital market-based approach likely to carry the day.14
                                                         
14See Walter [1993] and Story and Walter [1997].
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5. Strategic Options
The foregoing discussion is centered around a common-sense approach to
strategic positioning and execution after the launch of the euro. Put simply, it’s all a
matter of doing the right thing, and then doing it right. This invariably requires an astute
assessment of the prospective competitive battlefield, both in terms of market prospects
and competitive structures, which has to be based on a number of suppositions
reflecting a well-argued consensus among those creating the strategy. If important
suppositions turn out to be wrong, key parts of the strategy will be wrong too.
Once a judgment has been reached as to key client-groups, geographies and
product portfolios that may promise to generate acceptable risk-adjusted returns to
shareholders, a strategic configuration has to be devised for the institution that can
extract significant scale and scope economies and that can be managed effectively to
achieve strong operating economies. Such an optimum configuration may be termed
“strategic integrity.” It forms what the Germans call a “soll-Zustand” (what ought to be).
This has to compared with the “ist-Zustand” (what is), i.e., how does the institution
currently stack-up against all competitors, traditional and nontraditional, in the cold light
of day, and what will be required to compete effectively in the future in terms of capital,
human and managerial resources and organizational change.
Realistically comparing reality to strategic objectives in the presence of a critical
time element usually produces a number of show-stoppers. Rejecting losers among
strategic options is just as important as selecting winners, and is often much more
difficult – especially when opportunistic moves beckon and time is short. Failure to
reject losers probably results in a disproportionate number of what turn out to be
strategic errors in the financial services sector –  often at great expense to
shareholders.
Finally comes strategic implementation: Marshaling resources, controlling costs,
getting the troops on board, building a high-performance “super-culture” over what
inevitably will be a number of often very different “sub-cultures,” getting the right people,
and then providing effective leadership. The devil is always in the details.
If a strategic direction taken by the management of a financial firm in the euro-
zone does not exploit every source of potential value for shareholders, then what is the
purpose? Avoiding an acquisition attempt from a better-managed suitor who will pay a
premium price does not seem nearly as unacceptable today as it may have been in the
past. In a world of more open and efficient markets for shares in financial institutions,
shareholders increasingly tend to have the final say about the future of their enterprises.
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Annex 1 - Table A
Top-20 U.S. Bank Performance Data, November 1998
Total Assets Market cap Market Cap Tier 1 ROAE Net Int
Bank ($ billions) ($ billions) as % of Assets Equity (post tax) Margin P./E P/B
1 Citigroup 702 107.0 15.2% 8.3 6.5 5.1 n.a. n.a.
2 Chase Manhattan 357 48.7 13.6% 8.3 14.9 3.1 13.2 2.20
3 JP Morgan 299 16.6 5.6% 7.4 5.3 0.7 17.3 1.68
4 BankAmerica 264 99.9 37.8% 7.4 7.7 3.6 14.6 2.12
5 First Union 235 57.4 24.4% 7.1 23.5 3.8 15.5 3.31
6 Norwest/Wells Fargo 196 50.0 25.5% n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
7 Bankers Trust 156 6.0 3.8% 7.0 n.a. 1.0 8.7 1.44
8 BancOne 120 57.3 47.8% 9.2 21.8 5.3 14.4 2.81
9 Fleet Financial 100 22.7 22.7% 6.9 18.6 4.6 15.5 2.68
10 National City 83 21.2 25.5% 8.8 19.0 4.1 16.2 2.94
11 Key Corp 78 13.3 17.1% 6.7 18.1 4.2 13.7 2.38
12 PNC Bank 76 15.1 19.9% 7.4 20.5 3.8 15.4 2.75
13 BankBoston 74 10.8 14.6% 7.0 16.3 4.0 12.5 2.30
14 Bank of NY 64 23.6 36.9% 7.5 24.2 3.2 20.6 4.76
15 Wachovia 66 18.7 28.3% 8.1 18.2 6.2 20.4 3.52
16 Sun Trust Bank 61 14.6 23.9% 7.2 13.3 3.9 19.6 2.79
17 State Street 51 10.1 19.8% 14.3 20.0 1.8 23.4 4.51
18 Mellon Bank 48 15.7 32.7% 6.8 20.3 4.0 18.5 3.60
19 SouthTrust 36 6.0 16.7% 6.8 14.4 3.7 14.3 2.27
20 Comerica 34 10.0 6.5% 7.2 23.0 4.6 17.2 3.73
Total 3100.0 624.7 20.2%
Average Top 20 155.0 40.5 21.0% 7.6 15.7 3.6 14.3 2.4
U.S. Banks Average 8.6 16.2 3.7 15 2.85
Source:  Goldman Sachs & Co.
Annex 1 - Table B
Top-20 European Bank Performance Data, November 1998
Total Assets Market cap Market Cap Tier 1 ROAE Net Int Ln growth
Bank ($ billions) ($ billions) as % of Assets Equity (post tax) Margin 8 years P./E P/B
1 UBS 749 69.2 9.24% 7.5 21.6 1.0 n.a. 15.50 2.94
2 Deutsche Bank 693 33.4 4.82% 5.1 15.0 1.3 11.9 11.70 1.76
3 ABN-Amro 501 31.8 6.35% 7.2 18.3 1.7 28.1 16.00 2.12
4 Hypovereinsbank 492 31.3 6.36% 5.0 17.7 1.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
5 HBSC 487 55.5 11.40% 9.8 17.7 2.8 n.a. 12.00 2.02
6 Credit Suisse 477 46.4 6.56% 10.3 2.2 0.9 13.1 18.60 3.2
7 Dresdner 462 24.7 5.35% 5.7 15.0 1.3 8.5 19.70 2.04
8 ING Groep 456 55.2 12.11% 7.0 13.5 2.3 17.0 15.60 1.47
9 Societe Generale 418 18.2 4.35% 6.2 10.4 1.2 9.5 13.50 1.65
10 Barclays 406 35.6 8.77% 7.3 22.9 3.4 -0.5 12.20 2.70
11 Banque Nationale des Paris 346 14.6 4.22% 5.5 10.1 1.1 4.6 12.40 1.39
12 Commerzbank 343 13.8 4.02% 6.0 10.4 1.3 14.6 13.90 1.37
13 National Westminster 311 30.2 9.71% 8.1 18.6 3.3 1.2 12.80 2.37
14 San Paolo-IMI 200 12.0 6.00% 11.0 5.2 1.8 11.8 20.80 2.25
15 Lloyds TSB 234 64.8 27.69% 9.1 27.7 3.6 10.0 18.10 5.49
16 Santander 186 21.9 11.77% 8.3 22.2 2.6 30.2 19.90 3.33
17 BBV 147 26.9 18.30% 9.0 19.4 2.9 10.6 25.00 4.88
18 Bank Austria 126 6.9 5.48% 5.9 8.5 1.5 n.a. 6.40 1.07
19 Banco di Roma 119 10.3 8.66% 6.9 n.a. 2.4 n.a. 16.80 1.80
20 BCI 117 12.0 10.26% 7.8 5.1 2.9 12.2 23.40 2.32
Total 7270 614.7 8.46%
UK & Continental Avg. 7.4 14.6 1.7 10.9 14.5 2.06
Source:  Goldman Sachs & Co.
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Total Percent ofTop 25 (c)
Goldman Sachs & Co (2) 388,765.9 1,067,258.8 16,404.5 54,419.6 1,526,848.8 13.89%
Merrill Lynch & Co (1) 549,797.3 692,920.3 10,999.7 129,629.4 1,383,346.7 12.59%
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (4) 404,497.5 635,623.9 32,680.2 1,072,801.6 9.76%
Salomon Smith Barney /Citigroup (7/11) 366,353.8 483,761.8 107,565.7 51,412.2 1,009,093.5 9.18%
Credit Suisse First Boston (6) 290,502.0 431,756.5 19,086.9 60,166.1 801,511.5 7.29%
JP Morgan & Co. Inc. (5) 250,064.7 324,207.0 115,665.7 27,502.8 717,440.2 6.53%
Chase Manhattan Corporation (3) 122,602.9 172,858.9 307,131.0 20,448.0 623,040.8 5.67%
Lehman Brothers (8) 264,339.6 225,415.6 26,311.8 48,982.5 565,049.5 5.14%
Deutsche Bank / BT (15/16) 158,681.0 147,874.4 53,780.3 84,419.0 444,754.7 4.05%
Warburg Dillon Read / UBS (9) 201,809.6 143,743.3 17,009.9 53,780.1 416,342.9 3.79%
Bank of America Corp (14) 57,975.7 83,679.4 200,100.1 42,250.0 384,005.2 3.49%
Bear Stearns (12) 140,608.7 184,752.8 17,610.0 342,971.5 3.12%
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (13) 111,498.7 217,614.0 12,618.8 341,731.5 3.11%
ABN AMRO (17) 127,077.6 34,143.3 16,282.5 125,333.1 302,836.5 2.76%
Paribas / Societe Generale (25/41) 153,649.0 54,472.3 11,398.0 219,519.3 2.00%
Lazard Houses (18) 160,775.5 160,775.5 1.46%
Barclays Capital (19) 81,236.9 14,457.3 6,370.2 102,064.4 0.93%
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson (30) 54,611.5 37,373.2 8,273.0 100,257.7 0.91%
Rothschild Group (28) 84,291.2 84,291.2 0.77%
Nomura Securities (34) 58,998.1 14,556.0 73,554.1 0.67%
Schroder Group (22) 69,179.4 69,179.4 0.63%
BankBoston (38) 49,903.0 19,124.8 69,027.8 0.63%
First Union Corp (39) 24,972.3 21,591.7 20,000.0 66,564.0 0.61%
PaineWebber (23) 57,604.2 57,604.2 0.52%
HSBC (24) 57,260.5 57,260.5 0.52%
Top 25 Firms
Top 10 as % of  Top 25
















(a) Completed deals only.  Full credit to both advisors to targets and acquirers.
(b) Equal credit to both book runners if acting jointly.
(c) To avoid overestimation, the top 25 total -- $10,991,873.0 mil was used instead of he industry total -- $8,470,261.3 mil
Data:  Securities Data Corporation
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CIBC Wood Gundy Securities (27) 12,594.8 34,321.6 9,308.4 56,224.8 0.66%
BANK ONE Corp 53,445.1 53,445.1 0.63%
Wasserstein, Perella (33) 40,887.1 40,887.1 0.48%
Enskilda Securities 40,661.4 40,661.4 0.48%
Natwest (20) 39,208.6 39,208.6 0.46%
RBC Dominion Securities (35) 33,489.6 33,489.6 0.40%
Prudential Securities (31) 26,587.5 26,587.5 0.31%
Bank of New York (32) 25,834.9 25,834.9 0.31%
Toronto-Dominion Bank and Tr (40) 24,751.1 24,751.1 0.29%
Commerzbank AG (37) 11,778.3 10,000.0 21,778.3 0.26%
First Tennessee Bank, N.A. 21,357.4 21,357.4 0.25%
Scotiabank-Bank of Nova Scotia 14,001.0 14,001.0 0.17%
Daiwa Securities (29) 13,500.0 13,500.0 0.16%
Banque Nationale de Paris (26) 11,700.0 11,700.0 0.14%
Fleet Financial Group Inc 10,788.9 10,788.9 0.13%
ING Barings (36) 10,623.1 10,623.1 0.13%
Bayerische H-V 10,000.0 10,000.0 0.12%
Bank of Montreal Trust 9,751.9 9,751.9 0.12%
Sakura Bank, Ltd. 9,124.3 9,124.3 0.11%
PNC Bank NA 8,146.3 8,146.3 0.10%
Wells Fargo Bank NA (50) 6,875.8 6,875.8 0.08%
Banque Internationale Lux SA 5,744.5 5,744.5 0.07%
(a) Completed deals only.  Full credit to both advisors to targets and acquirers.
(b) Equal credit to both book runners if acting jointly.
Data:  Securities Data Corporation
Annex 3
Top Global Money Managers: AUM Execeeding $100 Million
(As of April, 1998) *
Total Assets Under Total Assets Under
Management Management
(millions) (millions)
UBS 920,000 Allianz AG 210,000
  (Zurich, Switzerland)   (Munich, Germany)
Japan Postal Insurance System 865,020 J.P. Morgan & Co. 208,605
  (Tokyo, Japan)   (New York, NY)
FMR Corp. 515,300 Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. 207,999
  (Boston, MA)    (New York, NY)
Groupe AXA-UAP 500,300 Franklin Resources 174,954
  (Paris, France)   (San Mateo, CA)
Zurich Group 460,000 Marsh & McLennan Cos. 173,443
  (Zurich, Switzerland)   (New York, NY)
Merrill Lynch & Co. (incl. MAM) 450,000 United Asset Management Corp. 168,024
  (New York, NY) - merged Nov. 97   (Boston, MA)
Barclays Bank PLC 385,449 Putnam Funds 161,000
  (London, UK)   (Boston, MA)
Credit Suisse/Winterthur 380,000 American Express Co. 147,696
  (Zurich, Switzerland)   (New York, NY)
The Prudential Corporation 350,000 Internationale Nederlanden Groep 140,000
  (London, UK)   (Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
Nippon Life Insurance Co. 342,800 Wellington Management Co. 133,162
  (Tokyo, Japan)    (Boston, MA)
The Vanguard Group 310,500 Northern Trust Corp. 130,252
  (Valley Forge, PA)   (Chicago, IL)
State Street Boston Corp. 300,947 Chase Manhattan Corp. 130,095
  (Boston, MA)   (New York, NY)
The Prudential Ins. Co. of America 271,700 Invesco Group Ltd. 126,172
  (Newark, NJ)   (London, UK)
Capital Group Cos. 259,704 Nomura Securities Corp. 115,000
  (Los Angeles, CA)   (Tokyo, Japan)
Mellon Bank Corp. 258,923 PNC Bank Corp. 110,396
  (Pittsburg, PA)   (Pittsburg, PA)
Deutsche Bank, AG 240,000 Pimco Advisors 110,022
  (Frankfurt, Germany)   (Newport Beach, CA)
Bankers Trust Co. 239,582 Federated Investors 101,300
  (New York, NY)   (Boston, MA)
Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter & Discover Co. 234,806 T. Rowe Price Associates 100,390
  (New York, NY)   (Baltimore, MD)
Citigroup 213,400
  (New York, NY) * Assumes completion of UBS and Citigroup
